Program: Undergraduate Economics
Course: Introductory Microeconomics (ECON 10100), aka "Pengantar Ekonomi 1 - PE1"
Instructors: Mari E. Pangestu and Arianto A. Patunru (TA: Rizky N. Siregar)
Classroom: A1-10, FEUI Depok, Mondays, 8-11am
Texts: Mankiw (Principles of Economics, 2008), Parkin (Economics, 2010)
Topics: concepts of economics, supply, demand, elasticity; basic consumer and producer theories, market structures, input markets, efficiency and public policy.
Program: Graduate Economics
Course: Advance Microeconomics (ECON 90103-3), aka "Ekonomi Mikro 3"
Instructor: Arianto A. Patunru (TA: Palupi)
Classroom: PLN-Room, Pascasarjana FEUI Depok, Wednesdays, 13-1530pm
Texts: Mas-Colell et al (Microeconomic Theory, 1995 plus a bunch of journal articles)
Topics: General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics
Office hours: Depok, Mondays before 1pm, Lecturers Room, Department of Economics, FEUI Depok.
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Yes, it is sad that our domestic economy is disintegrated. (Mercantilist campaign continues, anyway)
In what seems to be its campaign against everything import, Kompas again runs a headline today with a bombastic lead and heroic tone urging the stop of food import (27/8). They even use (unjustly, to my impression) Faisal Basri's concern about disintegration of domestic economy as their ammunition to call for mercantilism. I've been in close contact with Faisal Basri lately and we both (and many others) are very concerned about the disconnection across regions in Indonesia. Bang Faisal many times illustrates this problem with the fact that it is far easier to go from Palangkaraya to Pontianak (two cities in Kalimantan) via Jakarta (in Java), than directly. In my papers, I put more emphasis on the fact that our logistic costs are one of the highest in the world (14%, cf eg Japanese's 4%). In addition, a study my colleagues and I did in 2008 on land transportation also concludes in the negative: we are very inefficient due to legal and illegal collections on the street, poor infrastructure, and difficult topography. Finally, our ports are lame and have little incentives to improve since under the current, existing system, one port management (Pelindo) who books a loss should not be worried as it will be subsidized by the other Pelindos (the new shipping law addresses this issue with improvement policy but it is yet to be in effect). Add to that the many hurdles in customs. All and all, the big archipelago is really not an integrated economy, it is merely a constellation of many islands and regions with stark differences in prices, and hence standard of living. What is the solution? As I argue here and elsewhere, it requires logistics reform which includes serious improvement (and repair) on infrastructure especially port and road. I was in Kupang last month with my research team. We saw one obsolete weight station whose capacity was only 10 tons. As a response to that, all big, seemingly overload trucks were not allowed to pass through the station -- they were asked to make a small detour around the station. Only smaller trucks are to be weighted. It's funny and saddening. In another occasion, our researcher who rode with a trucker in a nightshift observed how the truck driver threw a matchbox filled with a 10,000 rupiah bill to an empty inspection station. When asked why he did that despite there was no one asking for it, the driver simply said "it's a custom". Again, nonsensical and saddening. All this contributes to our high cost economy. And again, it calls for reform in the logistics.
But Kompas takes all this problem about disintegrated domestic economy as part of their argument to call for import bans. Yes, they cited Faisal Basri as saying that three months ago we should have imported sugar and now it seems too late because suppliers have increased the price. That is probably true. But then they are back to their whole anti-import campaign. This is misleading. It confuses between facts (say, of the crisis) and recipe for longer term economic development. We have been with this problem in logistics and transportation for a long, long time. It needs improvement regardless of the crisis. Yes, we were hit by crisis but happened to be more resilient partly because coincidentally our exposure to trade is relatively low. But the entire world can not step back to relying only on domestic economies. Because at the same time production network and trade-in-tasks are growing. We don't want to miss the train. Nobody wants. But hey those are two different things. The crisis needs a short-term solution, deviating from normal, longer term development (eg. stimulus). This chain of arguments that (a) A crisis hits us, (b) We're fine because we don't trade too much, (c) Therefore the best way to go is to suppress trade even more and to go domestic instead, (d) So, stop import (while export is okay), and (e) While we're going to autarky, we need to address the logistic and infrastructure issue -- is misleading. It mixes up short term problem and longer term solution.
And banning food import? Even if we were all mercantilists now, have we forgotten that our food import is merely USD 5 billion while our non-oil/gas export stand at more than USD 100 billion? Have we forgotten that we are a giant in the world CPO market?
But Kompas takes all this problem about disintegrated domestic economy as part of their argument to call for import bans. Yes, they cited Faisal Basri as saying that three months ago we should have imported sugar and now it seems too late because suppliers have increased the price. That is probably true. But then they are back to their whole anti-import campaign. This is misleading. It confuses between facts (say, of the crisis) and recipe for longer term economic development. We have been with this problem in logistics and transportation for a long, long time. It needs improvement regardless of the crisis. Yes, we were hit by crisis but happened to be more resilient partly because coincidentally our exposure to trade is relatively low. But the entire world can not step back to relying only on domestic economies. Because at the same time production network and trade-in-tasks are growing. We don't want to miss the train. Nobody wants. But hey those are two different things. The crisis needs a short-term solution, deviating from normal, longer term development (eg. stimulus). This chain of arguments that (a) A crisis hits us, (b) We're fine because we don't trade too much, (c) Therefore the best way to go is to suppress trade even more and to go domestic instead, (d) So, stop import (while export is okay), and (e) While we're going to autarky, we need to address the logistic and infrastructure issue -- is misleading. It mixes up short term problem and longer term solution.
And banning food import? Even if we were all mercantilists now, have we forgotten that our food import is merely USD 5 billion while our non-oil/gas export stand at more than USD 100 billion? Have we forgotten that we are a giant in the world CPO market?
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Gold standard? Now? No way
Yesterday, as I was having sahoor, an academic cum cleric gave a talk on tv about sharia economy. He mentioned that one of the features of sharia economy is "gold or dinar standard". I'm not sure what he meant by putting gold and dinar side-by-side (maybe he thought now the dinar system is still fully gold-backed, and therefore the two are interchangeable).
A couple of days ago I participated in a seminar held by MOF. At lunch, an official, out of blue, asked my opinion about that same idea, ie gold standard. My response was "I don't think we will ever go back to gold standard. That BI storage will not be able to house the entire gold backing the money in circulation".
Today, Paul Donovan of UBS Investment Bank gives a more sophisticated answer (The Jakarta Post, 25/8). Bottomline is the same: There is not enough gold in the world. Here's his reasoning. Assume that globalization is steady with global trade stays at 20% of the world's GDP. If the the world's nominal GDP grows at 6-6.5%, then the supply of reserve currency should also rise by 6-6.5% to keep the international trade intact. Now, if we are to go back to gold standard, trade growth will not stay at 20%, let alone expand: it will shrink, as the supply of gold rises at 1.5% growth rate.
A couple of days ago I participated in a seminar held by MOF. At lunch, an official, out of blue, asked my opinion about that same idea, ie gold standard. My response was "I don't think we will ever go back to gold standard. That BI storage will not be able to house the entire gold backing the money in circulation".
Today, Paul Donovan of UBS Investment Bank gives a more sophisticated answer (The Jakarta Post, 25/8). Bottomline is the same: There is not enough gold in the world. Here's his reasoning. Assume that globalization is steady with global trade stays at 20% of the world's GDP. If the the world's nominal GDP grows at 6-6.5%, then the supply of reserve currency should also rise by 6-6.5% to keep the international trade intact. Now, if we are to go back to gold standard, trade growth will not stay at 20%, let alone expand: it will shrink, as the supply of gold rises at 1.5% growth rate.
Dare to stop import?
Misreading of the crisis aftermath (Indonesia has been quite resilient -- Indonesia's exposure to trade was quite low -- therefore, stop trading, go domestic) is getting pervasive. Kompas yesterday (24/8) ran couple of articles with anti-import tone. Today it continues, featuring Kadin chief in its headline (25/8). As quoted by Kompas, Hidayat says "If the government does not have the guts (to stop food import) and instead play blame gain among each other, we would not be self-sufficient in the next five years".
As I said repeatedly here, our conception of self-sufficent is false. We reached the so-called "rice-self sufficiency" briefly on the back of heavy protectionism.
Monday, August 24, 2009
Interesting paper of the week: Deaton on Aging, Religion, and Health
Aging, religion, and health
by Angus S. Deaton - #15271 (AG HC)
Abstract:
Durkheim's famous study of suicide is a precursor of a large contemporary literature that investigates the links between religion and health. The topic is particularly germane for the health of women and of the elderly, who are much more likely to be religious. In this paper, I use data from the Gallup World Poll to study the within and between country relationships between religiosity, age, and gender, as well as the effects of religiosity on a range of health measures and health-related behaviors. The main contribution of the current study comes from the coverage and richness of the data, which allow me to use nationally representative samples to study the correlates of religion within and between more than 140 countries using more than 300,000 observations. It is almost universally true that the elderly and women are more religious, and I find evidence in favor of a genuine aging effect, not simply a cohort effect associated with secularization.As in previous studies, it is not clear why women are so much more religious than men. In most countries, religious people report better health; they say they have more energy, that their health is better, and that they experience less pain. Their social lives and personal behaviors are also healthier; they are more likely to be married, to have supportive friends, they are more likely to report being treated with respect, they have greater confidence in the healthcare and medical system and they are less likely to smoke.But these effects do not all hold in all countries, and they tend to be stronger for men than for women.
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W15271
by Angus S. Deaton - #15271 (AG HC)
Abstract:
Durkheim's famous study of suicide is a precursor of a large contemporary literature that investigates the links between religion and health. The topic is particularly germane for the health of women and of the elderly, who are much more likely to be religious. In this paper, I use data from the Gallup World Poll to study the within and between country relationships between religiosity, age, and gender, as well as the effects of religiosity on a range of health measures and health-related behaviors. The main contribution of the current study comes from the coverage and richness of the data, which allow me to use nationally representative samples to study the correlates of religion within and between more than 140 countries using more than 300,000 observations. It is almost universally true that the elderly and women are more religious, and I find evidence in favor of a genuine aging effect, not simply a cohort effect associated with secularization.As in previous studies, it is not clear why women are so much more religious than men. In most countries, religious people report better health; they say they have more energy, that their health is better, and that they experience less pain. Their social lives and personal behaviors are also healthier; they are more likely to be married, to have supportive friends, they are more likely to report being treated with respect, they have greater confidence in the healthcare and medical system and they are less likely to smoke.But these effects do not all hold in all countries, and they tend to be stronger for men than for women.
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W15271
On Local Tax Law
The newly approved Local Tax Law stipulates the following 5 taxes allowed for provincial governments: vehicle tax, vehicle title-transfer tax, vehicle fuel tax, surface water tax, and cigarette tax. As many as 11 taxes are allowed for district/city governments: hotel tax, entertainment tax, advertisement tax, street-light tax, non-metal mineral tax, parking tax, ground water tax, swallow-nest tax (!), building and property tax, land and building rights entitlement tax (for lack of better translation). The law also allows 30 kinds of 'retribution' (user charges), grouped into 3 types: general service retribution (eg marketplace services), business service retribution (eg terminal and auction place services), and specific licence retribution (eg route permits). Finally, there is a progressive tax on second or more vehicles (with a tariff from 2 to 10 percent).
The above is based on a column by Harry Aziz, Bisinis Indonesia, 24/8). The author was the head of special committee for the draft, from the House side. He mentions that the reasons for progressive tax on vehicles are: inelatic demand of vehicles (I wonder what hi numbers are), fairness principle, local competition principle. He also adds that the collected tax should be earmarked to local infrastructure development. A tall order indeed.
The above is based on a column by Harry Aziz, Bisinis Indonesia, 24/8). The author was the head of special committee for the draft, from the House side. He mentions that the reasons for progressive tax on vehicles are: inelatic demand of vehicles (I wonder what hi numbers are), fairness principle, local competition principle. He also adds that the collected tax should be earmarked to local infrastructure development. A tall order indeed.
Sunday, August 23, 2009
Donate, no. Sell, yes
A small article in Kompas (27/8) talks about Indonesian Red Cross' difficulty in supplying blood for the needy. They oftentime have deficit than surplus as "there is more demand than supply". Yearly demand for blood is 4.3 million packs, while supply only stand at 1.2 million on average.
So stop relying on donation. Start blood market.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Info: Courses and Office Hours
The new academic term starts next week. I am assigned to teach Introduction to Microeconomics (undergraduate, co-teaching with Dr. Mari Pangestu) and Advance Microeconomics (PhD program). Info for students, I will be in Depok every Wednesday (Pascasarjana, 1-3pm) and Monday (not every week, as I'll take turns with Bu Mari; Departemen Ekonomi, 8-11am).
Separating underwriters from brokers
The government via the stock market regulator (Bapepam) is going to revise the Capital Market Law. The revisions include separation of investment management units from underwriting and brokering functions (The Jakarta Post, 22/8).
Not surprisingly, most securities firms react negatively as majority of them mix the two functions. The president director of Trimegah Securities for example reportedly said that the policy would "put pressure on our efficiency programs". He said that Bapepam should instead focus on enforcing good corporate governance.
I think his argument is ill-founded. What the Bapepam is doing is exactly an effort to enforce good corporate governance.
Monitoring sermons except those by...
The Jakarta Post reported that police would monitor provocative sermons given in mosques and mass gatherings (JP, 22/8). It is to avoid provocative and misleading preaches by clerics that can motivate violence and terrorism.
OK, what have they done to Ba'ashir? Was Ba'ashir's commending the bombers not provocative enough?
Are we going back to financial repression?
As if the strange deposit rate-cap policy isn't enough, Tony Prasetiantono calls for cut on profit margin (Kompas, 22/8). According to him, the agreement (to force deposit rate down to 8 percent and gradually closer to BI rate) will not be enough, because it only "affects the cost of fund". Sounds as if cost is not part of profit calculation, eh?
Friday, August 21, 2009
Add? For what?
So the World Bank urges GoI to increase budget allocation for infrastructure (Bisnis Indonesia, 21/8). Good. If only there is no problem in procurement and disbursement. Alas, everybody knows, GoI has not been capable in efficient handling of money. Even for the stimulus intended for infrastructure project (yes, stimulus for infrastructure -- funny), by end of July they could only spend less than 10 percent of it.
Force it down, eh?
As reported in Kompas (21/8), banks (mainly state-owned) agreed to cut deposit interest rates gradually to get closer to the BI rate. They think this will help "normalize" the movement of deposit and credit interest rates. I'm skeptical. First, as a depositor, one would seek for the highest real rate. If local banks set it low, she would transfer her money to some bank abroad, or convert it to other form of asset. Second, any agreement like this (between banks, in a moral suasion sort of way) is deemed to fail. One or two banks will eventually cheat and the rest will follow. Third, they miss the point. Banks' rates deviate from BI rate not because they just want to be different. It's because they still perceive a sizable risk. Attacking the rates is missing the culprit as it is the risk that needs to be minimized, through a more efficient credit bureau for example. Lastly, if the banks and the government and Bank Indonesia think that this forced rate is good for banks in general, they will be disappointed. Thus far, market has been segmented such that big depositors go to big banks and get interest rate higher than BI rate. The smaller depositors go to smaller banks and are paid interest below BI rate. Forcing big banks' interest down will attract the upper level of smaller depositors and therefore hurt the smaller banks.
Kudos to Pelindo I
I have been criticizing the management and system of the state-owned Indonesian Port Corporation (Pelindo), esp. on their cross-subsidization scheme. That is, if one Pelindo (we have four) books a loss, the others should subsidize it. This system creates no incentive to self-improve.
So, the news in the Jakarta Post (21/8) that Pelindo I has inked a joint commitment with private firms and local governments on a port development program is a good news.
Thursday, August 20, 2009
SME prefers foreign banks
Kompas (20/8) reported that small and medium enterprises prefer foreign banks to local ones because of easiness in paperworks as well as lower interest rates.
Chair of Indonesian Young Enterpreneurs, Erwin Aksa, urged Bank Indonesia to be critical to this situation, or it will kill the local banks.
Typical.
Thursday, August 06, 2009
Less expansive? Good!
The 2010 state budget plan is considered less expansive by many, and some call it contractive. I take it as a sign that GoI will focus more on efficiency. That is, to reduce problems in budget preparation, approval process, procurement sluggishness. So it's a good thing.
Tuesday, August 04, 2009
@ SMERU
Was at SMERU Research Institute to wish all the best to Sudarno Sumarto for his sabbatical leave to Stanford; and to Asep Suryahadi for his new position as the new Head of SMERU.
Mas Darno, you'll be missed. Keep up the good work. Kang Asep, congratulations. Looking forward to working with you.
Monday, August 03, 2009
Bloghopping eq, moved again
Now it's Becker-Posner, Jim Hamilton, Cafe Hayek, EconLog, MargRev, Mankiw, Krugman, Env-Econ, and the new addition: Scott Sumner.
The best definition of inflation
"The rise in aggregate nominal income required to keep aggregate utility constant"
That is by Scott Sumner.
That is by Scott Sumner.
Sunday, August 02, 2009
Congratz, Bang!
Congratulations to Darmin Nasution for his appointnment as Senior Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia and the chairman of Indonesian Economists Association.
Bang Darmin was a former head of LPEM. We once taught a parallel course on Indonesian Economy (with Faisal Basri -- also a former head of LPEM) at the extension program of FEUI back in 1997. I love Bang Darmin's sense of humor. He's also very tough. Rumor around the office boys and janitors has it, Bang Darmin once challenged somebody for a fist fight over a parking lot in Salemba Campus. He won without the fight, needless to say.
Being Normal
SB Joedono, a former head of LPEM gave us his wisdom. "The most difficult thing to do is to become normal".
Thanks, Pak Billy.
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Kudos to Pak Hadi
As many of you have heard, one of the Indonesian finest economists, Hadi Soesastro was awarded a doctor honoris causa degree in economics from the Australian National University.
I took Economics and Technology course from Pak Hadi sometime in 1993. I recall we had class often in CSIS (Tanah Abang) as Depok is too far. Then we became friends in seminars and conferences after I came back from US in 2004. We were also active in the Indonesian Economists Association (ISEI). Along these times, I keep learning a lot from Pak Hadi. I admire his vast knowledge as well as his international reputation.
Congratulations, Pak Hadi. It's long overdue.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Proud of students
These last weeks have been full of examining students' thesis defense. I'm impressed, especially by the senior college students (S1 Level, as opposed to the master's and PhD programs -- not that the latter two are lousy; they're great too, but not as impressive). Some of them write very well (some in proficient English, though not required). I'm also proud that many of them have left the "must have a regression or two no matter what"-paradigm. Instead, they demonstrate a lucid understanding of basic principles of economics. Yes, I have a very big hope on our S1 graduates. Keep up the good work, young fellas!
Sentence for the knive
The Economist this week runs a series of article reassessing the use of macroeconomics. In one of them, it says financial economics might be blamed for the recent crisis. That is akin to blaming a knive for a murder downtown.
Tuesday, July 07, 2009
Better proxy for human capital variable
Got problem in choosing good proxy for human capital in your estimating regression? Try school intensity (Duflo 2001, Comola and de Mello 2009 -- thanks for the paper, guys). It is the share of population born after 1963 multiplied by the number of schools built per children under SD Inpres program during 1973-78. The rationale is simple: the cohort of individuals born in districts that benefited from the program was more likely to stay longer at school and to earn more once joining the labor force.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Monday, June 15, 2009
New paper on Indonesian Agriculture
Forthcoming in Choices 24(2), 2009
Agriculture in Indonesia: Lagging Performance and Difficult Choices
by Richard Barichello (Univ. of British Columbia) and Arianto A. Patunru (Univ. of Indonesia)
Abstract
Indonesia's agriculture is significant in several world markets and continues to employ large numbers of the population, but is facing numerous difficult choices. Lagging productivity, conflicts across high farm prices, politics, and poverty, and environmental challenges combine to give reason for a reform of policies in this sector. We identify six major issues, chosen from the perspective of their political importance as well as what we judge to be their importance to the country's agricultural development prospects. It is striking how similar they are to those in other agricultural sectors around the world, especially in the OECD countries. Producer- consumer food price conflicts, slow productivity growth, public support of biofuels programs, environmental conflicts, and poverty reduction have generated the key policy debates within the sector.
Agriculture in Indonesia: Lagging Performance and Difficult Choices
by Richard Barichello (Univ. of British Columbia) and Arianto A. Patunru (Univ. of Indonesia)
Abstract
Indonesia's agriculture is significant in several world markets and continues to employ large numbers of the population, but is facing numerous difficult choices. Lagging productivity, conflicts across high farm prices, politics, and poverty, and environmental challenges combine to give reason for a reform of policies in this sector. We identify six major issues, chosen from the perspective of their political importance as well as what we judge to be their importance to the country's agricultural development prospects. It is striking how similar they are to those in other agricultural sectors around the world, especially in the OECD countries. Producer- consumer food price conflicts, slow productivity growth, public support of biofuels programs, environmental conflicts, and poverty reduction have generated the key policy debates within the sector.
Tuesday, June 09, 2009
Friday, June 05, 2009
Upcoming gig: Salzburg Global Seminar
Freeman Foundation Symposium 2009: Strengthening Cooperation Between the US and East Asia
Salzburg, Austria, June 6-11, 2009
Session One: The State of The Asia-Pacific Region
Charles Morrison, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI
Session Two: The Financial Crisis and Impact on Asia-Pacific
Peter Petri, Brandeis International Business School, USA
Gong Min, Xiamen University, China
Panel Discussion on Economic Recovery
Kenneth Cukier, The Economist
Mireya Solis, American University, Washington, DC
Arianto A. Patunru, Dept. of Economics, University of Indonesia
Session Three: Northeast Asia - Politics and International Relations
Ryo Sahashi, University of Tokyo
Fan Jishe, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Balbina Wang, National Defense University, Washington, DC
Session Four: China's Rise and Roles
Sun Zhe, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Carolyn Cartier, University of Southern California, USA
Zhang Yanbing, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Todd Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Session Five: Southeast Asia - Politican Change and International Relations
Thitinian Pongsudhirak, Chulalangkorn University, Bangkok
Kim Trinh, National University of Singapore
Dian Fatwa, Radio Australia, ABC
Savanphet Thongphane, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta
Session Six: Global Issues and the Role of the Asia-Pacific Region
Open discussion
Session Seven: Perceptions, Media, and Public Diplomacy
Zhou Qingan, Tsinghua University, Beijing
Hugo Restall, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong
Session Eight: Obama's Asia Policy - Change and Continuity
Open discussion
Salzburg, Austria, June 6-11, 2009
Session One: The State of The Asia-Pacific Region
Charles Morrison, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI
Session Two: The Financial Crisis and Impact on Asia-Pacific
Peter Petri, Brandeis International Business School, USA
Gong Min, Xiamen University, China
Panel Discussion on Economic Recovery
Kenneth Cukier, The Economist
Mireya Solis, American University, Washington, DC
Arianto A. Patunru, Dept. of Economics, University of Indonesia
Session Three: Northeast Asia - Politics and International Relations
Ryo Sahashi, University of Tokyo
Fan Jishe, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Balbina Wang, National Defense University, Washington, DC
Session Four: China's Rise and Roles
Sun Zhe, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Carolyn Cartier, University of Southern California, USA
Zhang Yanbing, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Todd Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Session Five: Southeast Asia - Politican Change and International Relations
Thitinian Pongsudhirak, Chulalangkorn University, Bangkok
Kim Trinh, National University of Singapore
Dian Fatwa, Radio Australia, ABC
Savanphet Thongphane, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta
Session Six: Global Issues and the Role of the Asia-Pacific Region
Open discussion
Session Seven: Perceptions, Media, and Public Diplomacy
Zhou Qingan, Tsinghua University, Beijing
Hugo Restall, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong
Session Eight: Obama's Asia Policy - Change and Continuity
Open discussion
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Demokrasi Niscaya Mengecewakan, Tapi...
Demokrasi Niscaya Mengecewakan, Tapi...
Posted at Facebook by Arianto A. Patunru on Thursday, May 14, 2009 at 6:17pm
(Catatan untuk diskusi dan peluncuran buku Demokrasi dan Kekecewaan, Salihara, 13 Mei 2009 -- dengan sedikit revisi pada typos -- AAP)
Demokrasi Niscaya Mengecewakan, Tapi...
Arianto A. Patunru
Tahun 1785. Ahli matematika Marquis de Condorcet menunjukkan sebuah cacat demokrasi pada sahabatnya, ekonom Jacques Turgot. Ada 300 rakyat yang akan memilih presiden: SBY, JK, atau Mega. Para pemilih itu berkerucut menjadi 3 kelompok, masing-masing 100 orang. Kelompok 1 lebih menyukai SBY ketimbang JK dan JK ketimbang Mega. Kelompok 2 paling suka JK disusul Mega lalu SBY. Kelompok 3 lain lagi; urutan preferensi mereka adalah Mega, SBY, lalu JK. Masuklah demokrasi: Siapa yang bakal menjadi presiden terpilih? Antara SBY dan JK, SBY lebih populer: di Kelompok 1 dan Kelompok 3, ia lebih disukai ketimbang JK. JK hanya unggul di Kelompok 2. Berarti dua pertiga rakyat, atau 200 orang akan memilih SBY, dan hanya 100 untuk JK. Kesimpulannya, antara SBY dan JK, SBY-lah yang akan menang. Bagaimana dengan JK versus Mega? Tampak bahwa mayoritas lebih suka JK ketimbang Mega: antara JK dan Mega, pemenangnya adalah JK. Terakhir, SBY versus Mega. Prinsip transititivitas dalam ilmu ekonomi berkata: Jika SBY lebih disukai ketimbang JK dan JK lebih disukai ketimbang Mega, maka tentulah SBY lebih disukai ketimbang Mega. Ternyata tidak: demokrasi lewat voting mayoritas dan satu-orang-satu-suara itu melanggar prinsip transitivitas. Relatif terhadap Mega, SBY hanya disukai di Kelompok 1; sementara Kelompok 2 dan Kelompok 3 lebih memilih Mega. Suara mayoritas demokratik mengunggulkan SBY ketimbang JK, JK ketimbang Mega,namun: Mega ketimbang SBY. Selamat datang di Paradoks Condorcet.
Apakah demokrasi memang sedemikian murungnya? Sebagian kita berkata, dunia Condorcet tadi terlalu naif dan menggampangkan. Dalam dunia nyata para pemilih punya otak. Dan mungkin ideologi. Kata pembela demokrasi, coba masukkan ideologi ke dalam cerita Condorcet, maka analisis rasional anda akanmusti membuang skenario yang tidak logis. Mari kita coba. Untuk berbicara ideologi, baik mungkin kita contohkan partai ketimbang individu. Bayangkan opsi PDIP, PD, atau PKS. Kelompok 1 yang sangat nasionalis lebih suka PDIP ketimbang PD, apalagi PKS. Kelompok 2 yang tidak suka ultra-nasionalisme lebih senang PD ketimbang PKS, dan masih lebih bisa menerima PKS ketimbang PDIP. Kelompok 3 cenderung alim dan islami. Mereka lebih suka PKS ketimbang PDIP, tapi lebih suka PDIP ketimbang ... PD. Sebentar, kata anda. Bagaimana mungkin pendukung PKS secara ikhlas memilih PDIP yang ”sungguh abangan” ketimbang PD yang lebih moderat, masih puasa dan jumatan? Di sini, informasi tentang demografi ideologi yang linier (maksudnya, ketiga partai seolah bisa dijejer di spektrum mistar garis lurus) membantu anda (dan mungkin, pemilih sendiri) untuk memprediksi keluaran pemilu. Logika itu berkata, Kelompok 3 sesungguhnya tidak eksis. Maka dengan hanya dua kelompok tersisa, anda tahu bahwa persaingan PDIP versus PD akan berakhir seri, PDIP versus PKS seri, dan PD versus PKS dimenangkan PD. Kesimpulannya: PD menjadi pemenang pemilu, sekalipun transitivitas sedikit dilukai. Ideologi linier menyelamatkan demokrasi dari Paradoks Condorcet. Atau tidak?
Betulkah ideologi terdistribusi linier macam itu? Jalin-kelindan partai-partai papan atas belakangan ini memberi jawab negatif: ideologi tidaklah linier. Bahkan mungkin sekali ideologi sesungguhnya tak pernah ada. Ada pemilih PDIP yang kecewa melihat partainya mesra-mesraan dengan Prabowo, ada simpatisan PKS yang kaget melihat panutannya mengusung Soeharto serta bertandang ke SBY. Dan besoknya kecewa. Lalu gonta-ganti pasangan lagi. Lusanya berubah lagi. Jika ideologi (atau ketiadaan ideologi) gagal membendung Paradoks Condorcet, demokrasi bakal macet. Siap-siaplah kecewa.
Sengkarut demokrasi itu bahkan kian gelap di tangan ekonom Kenneth Arrow. Berhujjah Arrow: Jika sebuah tata sosial voting bersifat transitif, ”konsisten pada kebulatan suara”, dan”bebas tetek bengek”, maka pasti ia adalah: kediktatoran. Jika anda lebih suka SBY daripada JK dan JK daripada Mega, maka anda haruslebih suka SBY ketimbang Mega; ini adalah transitivitas kita tadi. Jika semua orang di negara ini suka dengan Mega, maka apa pun mekanismenya, Mega pasti jadi presiden; itu adalah konsistensi kebulatan suara, unanimity. Jika anda lebih suka SBY ketimbang Mega, maka kehadiran Prabowo atau Wiranto sebagai alternatif tidak boleh menjadikan anda tiba-tiba berbalik memilih Mega ketimbang SBY – struktur preferensi anda mesti bebas dari alternatif yang tidak relevan terhadap pilihan awal; ini yang saya sebut serampangan sebagai ”bebas tetek bengek”. Dan lembar-lembar matematis Arrow membuat dunia semakin dismal: tidak mungkin sebuah tata sosial dengan sistem voting bisa sekaligus transitif, unanimous, bebas tetek bengek, dan non-diktator pada saat bersamaan. Inilah Teorema Ketakmungkinan Arrow. Ia membuat demokrasi sedih sungguh. Ketakmampuan sistem voting menghindari perangkap Condorcet dan Arrow menjadi sistem demokrasi plural-penuh rentan akan pilah suara, vote splitting. Anda dan kawan-kawan anda mendukung Golkar, karena tahu bahwa JK akan maju jadi presiden. Tiba-tiba Ical Bakri atau Akbar Tanjung juga mencalonkan diri. Suara Golkar terpecah. Akibatnya Golkar kalah, tak satupun dari mereka jadi presiden. Alhasil, demokrasi internal di Golkar mandeg.
Cara demokrasi macam itu – voting mayoritas – juga tumpul belaka dalam penyediaan barang publik. Tiga puluh keluarga di Kampung Salihara memerlukan lampu di jalan-jalan mereka Biaya menerangi jalan sekampung adalah 99 juta. Jika rakyat Salihara memutuskan untuk ”melampui” jalan, semua keluarga harus sawer sama rata. Ada 3 kelompok keluarga di sana (maka biaya per kelompok adalah 33 juta). Kelompok A adalah mereka yang melihat lampu jalan wajib hukumnya. Mereka sesungguhnya rela mengeluarkan uang sejumlah total 90 juta untuk keperluan tersebut (ekonom menyebut ini ”harga reservasi”, harga tertinggi yang tak anda ucapkan sebelum transaksi, namun rela terima jika terjadi). Kedua kelompok sisanya, B dan C, ternyata punya prioritas lain di atas lampu jalan. Harga reservasi mereka masing-masing 30 juta. Di sini voting kembali akan berakhir gelap: Kelompok A tentu setuju pelampuan jalan, mengingat biaya yang harus mereka tanggung (33) jauh di bawah “harga reservasi” mereka (90). Namun Kelompok B dan C akan menolak, karena biaya bagi mereka 3 juta lebih tinggi daripada jumlah yang mereka rela bayarkan (30). Mayoritas, 2/3 dari rakyat Salihara, dengan begitu akan menolak rencana pemasangan lampu jalan. Desa Salihara akan tetap gelap, ekonomi tetap sembab. Dan itu karena demokrasi.
Kita hampir putus asa. Dengan segala buram demokrasi di atas, akankah ia bisa terselamatkan? Syukurlah jawabnya: mungkin bisa. Di sebuah kampung lain bernama Internet, ternyata Paradoks Condorcet serta Kemuraman Arrow bisa diatasi. Sistem itu bernama voting berentang, range voting. Alih-alih mencontreng SBY, JK, atau Mega, berilah mereka skor dari 1 sampai 10. Seperti ketika Anda menilai buku di Amazon.com atau filem indie di YouTube. Tidak nyaman mungkin untuk mempanjangbeberkan bukti matematisnya di sini, namun beberapa ilmuwan ekonomi politik serius telah setuju bahwa ada solusi atas kedua masalah demokrasi di atas. Kuncinya adalah, anda bisa memberi angka yang sama kepada SBY dan JK – atau kombinasi apapun; sesuatu yang tidak boleh dalam sistem Condorcet dan Arrow. Transitivitas dan unanimitas menjadi lebih lunak, alternatif baru tidak akan mengganggu urutan preferensi, dan semua ini mungkin terjadi tanpa kediktatoran. Alhasil, pilah suara nan kacau itu takkan terjadi.
Atau biarkan pasar yang ambil alih. Tengok kembali Kampung Salihara yang masih gulita saban malam. Jika saja kelompok-kelompok keluarga di sana boleh bertransaksi bebas, maka niscaya akan ada tangan gaib yang merelokasi iuran. Kelompok A yang ngebet lampu bisa memberikan sebagian uang mereka kepada Kelompok B dan C sedemikian rupa sehingga kedua yang terakhir ini bersedia mendukung proyek pelampuan. Misalkan Kelompok A memberi 4 juta kepada masing-masing mereka. Maka, Kelompok A praktis mengeluarkan uang sejumlah 33 + 4 + 4 juta, alias 41 juta – masih jauh di bawah reservasi mereka. Akan halnya Kelompok B dan C, kini defisit 3 juta di masing-masing mereka dapat tertutupi oleh sumbangan 4 juta dari Kelompok A. Reservasi mereka seolah disubsidi, naik dari 30 juta menjadi 34 juta, dan karenanya mampu membayar iuran 33 juta. Alhasil, benderanglah Kampung Salihara. Gerobak ekonomi berdecit lagi bahkan ketika malam. Satu kosong untuk pasar. Benarkah?
Namun, sebelum kita tersenyum terlalu lebar membeli kedua kabar baik di atas – voting berentang dan pasar – saatnya kini untuk melihat caveat emptor. Yang lebih mudah adalah untuk voting berentang. Dengan empirik di jurnal ilmiah dan internet kita bisa percaya bahwa demokrasi masih bisa diandalkan. Namun sebagian kita tetap kecut kuatir. Jika memang voting berentang dapat mengenyahkan Condorcet maupun Arrow, apakah ia steril terhadap, lagi-lagi, main mata para pimpinan parpol? Mungkin tidak, tapi mungkin ini sudah bukan tanggung jawab demokrasi lagi. Atau bolehkah ini termasuk ke dalam apa yang disebut Herbert Kitschelt dan Ihsan Ali-Fauzi sebagai ”partai non-partai”?
Kedua, tentang pasar. Ada gundah dalam GM dan beberapa penanggap akan ekonomi pasar bebas. Bahwa laissez faire telah mati dan saatnya kini bagi ”kompromi Keynesian”. Keynes memang menulis obituari untuk laissez faire, namun obit itu cenderung hiperbolik; dan hiperbola tentu saja adalah gaya Keynes (sebagaimana Chairil Anwar berhak untuk marah pada masa, gaya, dan tempatnya sendiri). Namun Keynes tidak pernah menafikan pasar dan kerja pasar ke titik nol. Ia berusaha menyelamatkan kapitalisme. Dalam itu ia benar; dan juga salah. Salah, bahwa perangkap likuiditas abadi adanya. Benar bahwa ketika itu, seperti hari ini, dunia kekurangan permintaan agregat. Mengharapkan pasar sendirian menutup senjang permintaan-penawaran dalam jangka pendek mungkin musykil. Pasar memang bisa melakukannya, tapi lambat dan menyakitkan. Atau paling tidak, mencurigakan.
Jika Kelompok B dan C di Kampung Salihara tadi mafhum bahwa Kelompok A bersedia mensubsidi mereka, timbullah risiko moral. Mereka akan berlaku seolah harga reservasi mereka adalah ... nol, sembari mengharap semua biaya ditanggung Kelompok A dan mereka tinggal menunggang gratis. Tapi kita tahu, takkan ada lampu, karena total dana 90 juta tidak mencapai total biaya 99 juta. Lampu hanya bisa ada ketika kedua kelompok penunggang gratis ini juga merogoh kocek mereka sendiri masing-masing 4,5 juta, demi menutup senjang 9 juta. Berapa lama proses ini berlangsung? Bisa lama. Kalau ia tentang lampu, kita bisa sabar. Negosiasi di Kampung Salihara biarlah berjalan pelan tapi pasti, menuju keseimbangannya yang damai: 90-4,5-4,5-Benderang. Atau keseimbangan ceria yang lain di antara itu dan 39-30-30-Benderang, tergantung kuat-kuatan tawar. Ada banyak sekali kemungkinan di spektrum ini. Namun butuh waktu untuk mencapai salah satu saja. Waktu yang mungkin lama. Lagi, jika itu lampu, kita tunggu. Tapi jika ia obat penangkal flu ganas, stimulus fiskal peredam krisis ekonomi, berapa lama kita menunggu? Tentu jangan lama betul, kalau kita tidak rela melihat flu ganas itu merayap, krisis ekonomi itu menyayat. Di sini kemudian kita buka sedikit ruang bagi pemerintah. Jika negosiasi antar pelaku ekonomi bakal terlalu mahal, jika sebuah barang publik dinikmati gratis sekelompok orang dan dibiayai oleh kelompok lain yang terzalimi, maka pemerintah bisa membantu ”relokasi”. Pemerintah perlu membantu. Hanya, membantu adalah kata kerja sementara. Dan seringkali pembantu perlu dibantu. Topik untuk diskusi yang lain, mungkin.
Kompromi Keynesian dengan begitu bukanlah pilihan biner antara pasar dan negara. Ia adalah tentang sempit-lebarnya pintu kita buka buat pemerintah, untuk masuk ke ruang bernama pasar. Di sini sepertinya kita perlu arif dan hati-hati: di dalam ruang itu ada proses-proses bernama demokrasi. Biarkanlah mereka bergerak dinamis tanpa pernah sampai. Sebab sekali ia sampai, ia bisa jatuh pada kesesatan atau kesetanan logika serta penghianatan preferensi konstituen. Cukup ia menjadi alat, menjadi kendaraan. Ia adalah piranti distribusi antara elit kekuasaaan dan warga negara. Elit membutuhkan rasa kuasa, dan uang. Warga negara mencari uang, atau kesejahteraan (yang selalu bisa ”diuangkan”).
Penengah di antara kedua gaya tarik-menarik ini mustinya adalah demokrasi: sebuah alternatif rasional yang lebih murah ketimbang revolusi – dengan segala kekurangannya. Ia bandul yang bergerak, dan sebaiknya bergerak, menjaga ekuilibrium dinamis di antara negara dan warganya. Lewat GM, kita tahu bahwa Laclau dan Moffe itu akan setuju dengan ini: kwasi-stabil, equilibrium yang bergerak. Kalau ia berhenti, ruang itu menjadi kaku. Konsensus, seperti dikuatirkan Robertus Robet. Mungkin memang kita bisa lebih nyaman denganproses bor Bill Liddle pada kayu keras, ketimbang ketika kayu itu akhirnya tembus berlubang – sampai, dengan kata lain. Rocky Gerung kuatir bahwa masalah demokrasi sebenarnya adalah ketegangan antara politik elektoral dan politik kewarganegaraan. Tapi justru demokrasi adalah jembatan di antaranya.
Tentu, kalau ia, demokrasi, bergerak terlalu liar, kita gugup. Maka kadang-kadang pintu itu kita buka, mengundang pemerintah untuk sesekali memperbaiki bandul, lalu keluar lagi dan menonton dari balik kaca. Asal demokrasi bergerak. Gerakan itu mungkin yang bisa menenangkan GM dari mimpi buruknya akan ”kurva lonceng” demokrasi. Baik atau buruk, bukankah SBY dulu datang dari ekor kurva? Betul bahwa seiring pergerakan hari, SBY pun merapat ke massa di tengah kurva lonceng. Sebagaimana Felipe Gonzáles Márquez atau bahkan Hugo Chavez.
Kita yang di dalam ruangan coba menikmati saja (atau kata Rizal Panggabean: terima dengan rasa dongkol dan sebal). Jika kita resah dengan kurva lonceng yang berat di tengah, kita ingat saja bahwa kurva itu masih punya ekor di kiri-kanannya, tempat di mana angsa hitam bermunculan mendadak. Apakah demokrasi Superman-Beckham-Papanya-Cynthia lebih baik daripada selingkuh di pucuk-pucuk pimpinan antarpartai? Kita tidak tahu. Mungkin tak perlu tahu, dan tak perlu buru-buru menjawab Dodi Ambardi: menjadi pelaku sejarah atau pencatat sejarah. Karena kepolosan tampaknya masih bisa berhelat. Tinggal pandai-pandai kita menangkap kairos.
Jakarta, 13 Mei 2009
Demokrasi Niscaya Mengecewakan, Tapi...
Arianto A. Patunru
Saya awam sungguh akan Rancière atau Badiou. Akan le politique atau la politique. Tapi kegusaran Goenawan Mohamad (GM) akan wujud laku demokrasi di Indonesia menarik untuk direnungi. Tentu saja para penanggap terbaik telah tersedia manis di buku baru ini, Demokrasi dan Kekecewaan. Mengulang mereka bukanlah efisien. Saya ingin mengganggu saja. Bahwa memang demokrasi bisa mengecewakan.
Tahun 1785. Ahli matematika Marquis de Condorcet menunjukkan sebuah cacat demokrasi pada sahabatnya, ekonom Jacques Turgot. Ada 300 rakyat yang akan memilih presiden: SBY, JK, atau Mega. Para pemilih itu berkerucut menjadi 3 kelompok, masing-masing 100 orang. Kelompok 1 lebih menyukai SBY ketimbang JK dan JK ketimbang Mega. Kelompok 2 paling suka JK disusul Mega lalu SBY. Kelompok 3 lain lagi; urutan preferensi mereka adalah Mega, SBY, lalu JK. Masuklah demokrasi: Siapa yang bakal menjadi presiden terpilih? Antara SBY dan JK, SBY lebih populer: di Kelompok 1 dan Kelompok 3, ia lebih disukai ketimbang JK. JK hanya unggul di Kelompok 2. Berarti dua pertiga rakyat, atau 200 orang akan memilih SBY, dan hanya 100 untuk JK. Kesimpulannya, antara SBY dan JK, SBY-lah yang akan menang. Bagaimana dengan JK versus Mega? Tampak bahwa mayoritas lebih suka JK ketimbang Mega: antara JK dan Mega, pemenangnya adalah JK. Terakhir, SBY versus Mega. Prinsip transititivitas dalam ilmu ekonomi berkata: Jika SBY lebih disukai ketimbang JK dan JK lebih disukai ketimbang Mega, maka tentulah SBY lebih disukai ketimbang Mega. Ternyata tidak: demokrasi lewat voting mayoritas dan satu-orang-satu-suara itu melanggar prinsip transitivitas. Relatif terhadap Mega, SBY hanya disukai di Kelompok 1; sementara Kelompok 2 dan Kelompok 3 lebih memilih Mega. Suara mayoritas demokratik mengunggulkan SBY ketimbang JK, JK ketimbang Mega,namun: Mega ketimbang SBY. Selamat datang di Paradoks Condorcet.
Apakah demokrasi memang sedemikian murungnya? Sebagian kita berkata, dunia Condorcet tadi terlalu naif dan menggampangkan. Dalam dunia nyata para pemilih punya otak. Dan mungkin ideologi. Kata pembela demokrasi, coba masukkan ideologi ke dalam cerita Condorcet, maka analisis rasional anda akanmusti membuang skenario yang tidak logis. Mari kita coba. Untuk berbicara ideologi, baik mungkin kita contohkan partai ketimbang individu. Bayangkan opsi PDIP, PD, atau PKS. Kelompok 1 yang sangat nasionalis lebih suka PDIP ketimbang PD, apalagi PKS. Kelompok 2 yang tidak suka ultra-nasionalisme lebih senang PD ketimbang PKS, dan masih lebih bisa menerima PKS ketimbang PDIP. Kelompok 3 cenderung alim dan islami. Mereka lebih suka PKS ketimbang PDIP, tapi lebih suka PDIP ketimbang ... PD. Sebentar, kata anda. Bagaimana mungkin pendukung PKS secara ikhlas memilih PDIP yang ”sungguh abangan” ketimbang PD yang lebih moderat, masih puasa dan jumatan? Di sini, informasi tentang demografi ideologi yang linier (maksudnya, ketiga partai seolah bisa dijejer di spektrum mistar garis lurus) membantu anda (dan mungkin, pemilih sendiri) untuk memprediksi keluaran pemilu. Logika itu berkata, Kelompok 3 sesungguhnya tidak eksis. Maka dengan hanya dua kelompok tersisa, anda tahu bahwa persaingan PDIP versus PD akan berakhir seri, PDIP versus PKS seri, dan PD versus PKS dimenangkan PD. Kesimpulannya: PD menjadi pemenang pemilu, sekalipun transitivitas sedikit dilukai. Ideologi linier menyelamatkan demokrasi dari Paradoks Condorcet. Atau tidak?
Betulkah ideologi terdistribusi linier macam itu? Jalin-kelindan partai-partai papan atas belakangan ini memberi jawab negatif: ideologi tidaklah linier. Bahkan mungkin sekali ideologi sesungguhnya tak pernah ada. Ada pemilih PDIP yang kecewa melihat partainya mesra-mesraan dengan Prabowo, ada simpatisan PKS yang kaget melihat panutannya mengusung Soeharto serta bertandang ke SBY. Dan besoknya kecewa. Lalu gonta-ganti pasangan lagi. Lusanya berubah lagi. Jika ideologi (atau ketiadaan ideologi) gagal membendung Paradoks Condorcet, demokrasi bakal macet. Siap-siaplah kecewa.
Sengkarut demokrasi itu bahkan kian gelap di tangan ekonom Kenneth Arrow. Berhujjah Arrow: Jika sebuah tata sosial voting bersifat transitif, ”konsisten pada kebulatan suara”, dan”bebas tetek bengek”, maka pasti ia adalah: kediktatoran. Jika anda lebih suka SBY daripada JK dan JK daripada Mega, maka anda haruslebih suka SBY ketimbang Mega; ini adalah transitivitas kita tadi. Jika semua orang di negara ini suka dengan Mega, maka apa pun mekanismenya, Mega pasti jadi presiden; itu adalah konsistensi kebulatan suara, unanimity. Jika anda lebih suka SBY ketimbang Mega, maka kehadiran Prabowo atau Wiranto sebagai alternatif tidak boleh menjadikan anda tiba-tiba berbalik memilih Mega ketimbang SBY – struktur preferensi anda mesti bebas dari alternatif yang tidak relevan terhadap pilihan awal; ini yang saya sebut serampangan sebagai ”bebas tetek bengek”. Dan lembar-lembar matematis Arrow membuat dunia semakin dismal: tidak mungkin sebuah tata sosial dengan sistem voting bisa sekaligus transitif, unanimous, bebas tetek bengek, dan non-diktator pada saat bersamaan. Inilah Teorema Ketakmungkinan Arrow. Ia membuat demokrasi sedih sungguh. Ketakmampuan sistem voting menghindari perangkap Condorcet dan Arrow menjadi sistem demokrasi plural-penuh rentan akan pilah suara, vote splitting. Anda dan kawan-kawan anda mendukung Golkar, karena tahu bahwa JK akan maju jadi presiden. Tiba-tiba Ical Bakri atau Akbar Tanjung juga mencalonkan diri. Suara Golkar terpecah. Akibatnya Golkar kalah, tak satupun dari mereka jadi presiden. Alhasil, demokrasi internal di Golkar mandeg.
Cara demokrasi macam itu – voting mayoritas – juga tumpul belaka dalam penyediaan barang publik. Tiga puluh keluarga di Kampung Salihara memerlukan lampu di jalan-jalan mereka Biaya menerangi jalan sekampung adalah 99 juta. Jika rakyat Salihara memutuskan untuk ”melampui” jalan, semua keluarga harus sawer sama rata. Ada 3 kelompok keluarga di sana (maka biaya per kelompok adalah 33 juta). Kelompok A adalah mereka yang melihat lampu jalan wajib hukumnya. Mereka sesungguhnya rela mengeluarkan uang sejumlah total 90 juta untuk keperluan tersebut (ekonom menyebut ini ”harga reservasi”, harga tertinggi yang tak anda ucapkan sebelum transaksi, namun rela terima jika terjadi). Kedua kelompok sisanya, B dan C, ternyata punya prioritas lain di atas lampu jalan. Harga reservasi mereka masing-masing 30 juta. Di sini voting kembali akan berakhir gelap: Kelompok A tentu setuju pelampuan jalan, mengingat biaya yang harus mereka tanggung (33) jauh di bawah “harga reservasi” mereka (90). Namun Kelompok B dan C akan menolak, karena biaya bagi mereka 3 juta lebih tinggi daripada jumlah yang mereka rela bayarkan (30). Mayoritas, 2/3 dari rakyat Salihara, dengan begitu akan menolak rencana pemasangan lampu jalan. Desa Salihara akan tetap gelap, ekonomi tetap sembab. Dan itu karena demokrasi.
Kita hampir putus asa. Dengan segala buram demokrasi di atas, akankah ia bisa terselamatkan? Syukurlah jawabnya: mungkin bisa. Di sebuah kampung lain bernama Internet, ternyata Paradoks Condorcet serta Kemuraman Arrow bisa diatasi. Sistem itu bernama voting berentang, range voting. Alih-alih mencontreng SBY, JK, atau Mega, berilah mereka skor dari 1 sampai 10. Seperti ketika Anda menilai buku di Amazon.com atau filem indie di YouTube. Tidak nyaman mungkin untuk mempanjangbeberkan bukti matematisnya di sini, namun beberapa ilmuwan ekonomi politik serius telah setuju bahwa ada solusi atas kedua masalah demokrasi di atas. Kuncinya adalah, anda bisa memberi angka yang sama kepada SBY dan JK – atau kombinasi apapun; sesuatu yang tidak boleh dalam sistem Condorcet dan Arrow. Transitivitas dan unanimitas menjadi lebih lunak, alternatif baru tidak akan mengganggu urutan preferensi, dan semua ini mungkin terjadi tanpa kediktatoran. Alhasil, pilah suara nan kacau itu takkan terjadi.
Atau biarkan pasar yang ambil alih. Tengok kembali Kampung Salihara yang masih gulita saban malam. Jika saja kelompok-kelompok keluarga di sana boleh bertransaksi bebas, maka niscaya akan ada tangan gaib yang merelokasi iuran. Kelompok A yang ngebet lampu bisa memberikan sebagian uang mereka kepada Kelompok B dan C sedemikian rupa sehingga kedua yang terakhir ini bersedia mendukung proyek pelampuan. Misalkan Kelompok A memberi 4 juta kepada masing-masing mereka. Maka, Kelompok A praktis mengeluarkan uang sejumlah 33 + 4 + 4 juta, alias 41 juta – masih jauh di bawah reservasi mereka. Akan halnya Kelompok B dan C, kini defisit 3 juta di masing-masing mereka dapat tertutupi oleh sumbangan 4 juta dari Kelompok A. Reservasi mereka seolah disubsidi, naik dari 30 juta menjadi 34 juta, dan karenanya mampu membayar iuran 33 juta. Alhasil, benderanglah Kampung Salihara. Gerobak ekonomi berdecit lagi bahkan ketika malam. Satu kosong untuk pasar. Benarkah?
Namun, sebelum kita tersenyum terlalu lebar membeli kedua kabar baik di atas – voting berentang dan pasar – saatnya kini untuk melihat caveat emptor. Yang lebih mudah adalah untuk voting berentang. Dengan empirik di jurnal ilmiah dan internet kita bisa percaya bahwa demokrasi masih bisa diandalkan. Namun sebagian kita tetap kecut kuatir. Jika memang voting berentang dapat mengenyahkan Condorcet maupun Arrow, apakah ia steril terhadap, lagi-lagi, main mata para pimpinan parpol? Mungkin tidak, tapi mungkin ini sudah bukan tanggung jawab demokrasi lagi. Atau bolehkah ini termasuk ke dalam apa yang disebut Herbert Kitschelt dan Ihsan Ali-Fauzi sebagai ”partai non-partai”?
Kedua, tentang pasar. Ada gundah dalam GM dan beberapa penanggap akan ekonomi pasar bebas. Bahwa laissez faire telah mati dan saatnya kini bagi ”kompromi Keynesian”. Keynes memang menulis obituari untuk laissez faire, namun obit itu cenderung hiperbolik; dan hiperbola tentu saja adalah gaya Keynes (sebagaimana Chairil Anwar berhak untuk marah pada masa, gaya, dan tempatnya sendiri). Namun Keynes tidak pernah menafikan pasar dan kerja pasar ke titik nol. Ia berusaha menyelamatkan kapitalisme. Dalam itu ia benar; dan juga salah. Salah, bahwa perangkap likuiditas abadi adanya. Benar bahwa ketika itu, seperti hari ini, dunia kekurangan permintaan agregat. Mengharapkan pasar sendirian menutup senjang permintaan-penawaran dalam jangka pendek mungkin musykil. Pasar memang bisa melakukannya, tapi lambat dan menyakitkan. Atau paling tidak, mencurigakan.
Jika Kelompok B dan C di Kampung Salihara tadi mafhum bahwa Kelompok A bersedia mensubsidi mereka, timbullah risiko moral. Mereka akan berlaku seolah harga reservasi mereka adalah ... nol, sembari mengharap semua biaya ditanggung Kelompok A dan mereka tinggal menunggang gratis. Tapi kita tahu, takkan ada lampu, karena total dana 90 juta tidak mencapai total biaya 99 juta. Lampu hanya bisa ada ketika kedua kelompok penunggang gratis ini juga merogoh kocek mereka sendiri masing-masing 4,5 juta, demi menutup senjang 9 juta. Berapa lama proses ini berlangsung? Bisa lama. Kalau ia tentang lampu, kita bisa sabar. Negosiasi di Kampung Salihara biarlah berjalan pelan tapi pasti, menuju keseimbangannya yang damai: 90-4,5-4,5-Benderang. Atau keseimbangan ceria yang lain di antara itu dan 39-30-30-Benderang, tergantung kuat-kuatan tawar. Ada banyak sekali kemungkinan di spektrum ini. Namun butuh waktu untuk mencapai salah satu saja. Waktu yang mungkin lama. Lagi, jika itu lampu, kita tunggu. Tapi jika ia obat penangkal flu ganas, stimulus fiskal peredam krisis ekonomi, berapa lama kita menunggu? Tentu jangan lama betul, kalau kita tidak rela melihat flu ganas itu merayap, krisis ekonomi itu menyayat. Di sini kemudian kita buka sedikit ruang bagi pemerintah. Jika negosiasi antar pelaku ekonomi bakal terlalu mahal, jika sebuah barang publik dinikmati gratis sekelompok orang dan dibiayai oleh kelompok lain yang terzalimi, maka pemerintah bisa membantu ”relokasi”. Pemerintah perlu membantu. Hanya, membantu adalah kata kerja sementara. Dan seringkali pembantu perlu dibantu. Topik untuk diskusi yang lain, mungkin.
Kompromi Keynesian dengan begitu bukanlah pilihan biner antara pasar dan negara. Ia adalah tentang sempit-lebarnya pintu kita buka buat pemerintah, untuk masuk ke ruang bernama pasar. Di sini sepertinya kita perlu arif dan hati-hati: di dalam ruang itu ada proses-proses bernama demokrasi. Biarkanlah mereka bergerak dinamis tanpa pernah sampai. Sebab sekali ia sampai, ia bisa jatuh pada kesesatan atau kesetanan logika serta penghianatan preferensi konstituen. Cukup ia menjadi alat, menjadi kendaraan. Ia adalah piranti distribusi antara elit kekuasaaan dan warga negara. Elit membutuhkan rasa kuasa, dan uang. Warga negara mencari uang, atau kesejahteraan (yang selalu bisa ”diuangkan”).
Penengah di antara kedua gaya tarik-menarik ini mustinya adalah demokrasi: sebuah alternatif rasional yang lebih murah ketimbang revolusi – dengan segala kekurangannya. Ia bandul yang bergerak, dan sebaiknya bergerak, menjaga ekuilibrium dinamis di antara negara dan warganya. Lewat GM, kita tahu bahwa Laclau dan Moffe itu akan setuju dengan ini: kwasi-stabil, equilibrium yang bergerak. Kalau ia berhenti, ruang itu menjadi kaku. Konsensus, seperti dikuatirkan Robertus Robet. Mungkin memang kita bisa lebih nyaman denganproses bor Bill Liddle pada kayu keras, ketimbang ketika kayu itu akhirnya tembus berlubang – sampai, dengan kata lain. Rocky Gerung kuatir bahwa masalah demokrasi sebenarnya adalah ketegangan antara politik elektoral dan politik kewarganegaraan. Tapi justru demokrasi adalah jembatan di antaranya.
Tentu, kalau ia, demokrasi, bergerak terlalu liar, kita gugup. Maka kadang-kadang pintu itu kita buka, mengundang pemerintah untuk sesekali memperbaiki bandul, lalu keluar lagi dan menonton dari balik kaca. Asal demokrasi bergerak. Gerakan itu mungkin yang bisa menenangkan GM dari mimpi buruknya akan ”kurva lonceng” demokrasi. Baik atau buruk, bukankah SBY dulu datang dari ekor kurva? Betul bahwa seiring pergerakan hari, SBY pun merapat ke massa di tengah kurva lonceng. Sebagaimana Felipe Gonzáles Márquez atau bahkan Hugo Chavez.
Kita yang di dalam ruangan coba menikmati saja (atau kata Rizal Panggabean: terima dengan rasa dongkol dan sebal). Jika kita resah dengan kurva lonceng yang berat di tengah, kita ingat saja bahwa kurva itu masih punya ekor di kiri-kanannya, tempat di mana angsa hitam bermunculan mendadak. Apakah demokrasi Superman-Beckham-Papanya-Cynthia lebih baik daripada selingkuh di pucuk-pucuk pimpinan antarpartai? Kita tidak tahu. Mungkin tak perlu tahu, dan tak perlu buru-buru menjawab Dodi Ambardi: menjadi pelaku sejarah atau pencatat sejarah. Karena kepolosan tampaknya masih bisa berhelat. Tinggal pandai-pandai kita menangkap kairos.
Jakarta, 13 Mei 2009
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Friday, April 10, 2009
Very, very useful resources
For those studying or doing research on commodity futures markets. Compiled by Scott Irwin of UIUC.
Thanks, Scott!
Thanks, Scott!
Friday, April 03, 2009
Publishing as Prostitution?
Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers accepted if they intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees who have no property rights to the journals they advise. Intellectual prostitution is neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights to the journal) should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees should only offer suggestions for improvement. The author may disregard this advice. This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.
That's Bruno S. Frey in Public Choice 116:205-23, 2003. Amusing read. This post's title steals the paper's.
Overheard in the Politician's Room
"Welcome Gentlemen, thank you for coming"
"What's this for? We're busy"
"I know. We appreciate your giving us your precious time. You know we have been very..."
"Oh, cut the crap. What is it?"
"OK. Here's the thing. The situation is dire, as you are all well aware. And we need trust from the people... You know, election and all..."
"So?"
"So, we need you in two things"
"Yes?"
"First funding..."
"Hey, you call us here for that? We've been giving you money like forever. That's not news anymore"
"Alrite. Thank you for that. The second one is far more important... Wait I should say equally important"
"Quick"
"Yes, it's eergh we want you to understand that we will have to bash you, the wealthy, in public..."
"Hah? What do you mean?"
"You know, in this time, it is very important to be seemed as being supportive to the unlucky -- the poor that is. The world situation is bleak because of what Madoff and his ilk was doing..."
"What the hell does it have to do with us?"
"Well, you're rich. To average people, you're guilty by association"
"Damn"
"I know. But please understand. This is just a ... well, game, if you like. We're gonna say in public that you, the rich, are the roots of all evil... Pardon my language... But off course we don't mean that"
"Say again?"
"We'll call you evil. We need to do that to gain support from the general population, especially the poor. But we don't mean it"
"OK, I don't care"
"Thank you, Gentlemen... May God bless you"
"What's this for? We're busy"
"I know. We appreciate your giving us your precious time. You know we have been very..."
"Oh, cut the crap. What is it?"
"OK. Here's the thing. The situation is dire, as you are all well aware. And we need trust from the people... You know, election and all..."
"So?"
"So, we need you in two things"
"Yes?"
"First funding..."
"Hey, you call us here for that? We've been giving you money like forever. That's not news anymore"
"Alrite. Thank you for that. The second one is far more important... Wait I should say equally important"
"Quick"
"Yes, it's eergh we want you to understand that we will have to bash you, the wealthy, in public..."
"Hah? What do you mean?"
"You know, in this time, it is very important to be seemed as being supportive to the unlucky -- the poor that is. The world situation is bleak because of what Madoff and his ilk was doing..."
"What the hell does it have to do with us?"
"Well, you're rich. To average people, you're guilty by association"
"Damn"
"I know. But please understand. This is just a ... well, game, if you like. We're gonna say in public that you, the rich, are the roots of all evil... Pardon my language... But off course we don't mean that"
"Say again?"
"We'll call you evil. We need to do that to gain support from the general population, especially the poor. But we don't mean it"
"OK, I don't care"
"Thank you, Gentlemen... May God bless you"
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Lame Police Doesn't Understand What Law Is For
A little news in Kompas today (22/3/2009). Chief of South Sumatra Police Department gave an award to a driver who killed two robbers by crashing them with his car. See the problem? Yes, you don't need the police. Average citizens, go kill the bad guys.
Equally saddening is the tone of the news. The journalist who wrote sound proud of that killer driver.
Friday, February 27, 2009
Sustainable development and economic valuation
Below is my address to the East Asia's Sustainable Automobile Society in a meeting in Bangkok last week.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Economy and the environment are not independent one another. In fact, economic activities take place in environment and their outcomes are both affected and affecting the environment. This is true particularly because both consumption and production – the two basic economic activities – use resources from the nature as their inputs. Furthermore, those activities generate both output and waste. The capacity of the environment to assimilate waste will determine the future condition of the environment and hence its ability to support economic activities. Finally it should be mentioned that economic activities end up at the provision of utility to economic agents. Here too, the environment can have direct impact. That is, amenity may or may not enter directly into one's utility function. Recognizing the interrelationship between environment, natural resources, consumption, production, and utility is necessary to put economics into the realm of sustainable development, i.e. development that strikes the balance between economic activities and environmental preservation as well as between generations.
In order to appreciate the role of the environment and natural resources in economic context, one needs to have a framework. This framework would preferably be able to lend itself into the widely used cost-benefit analysis. Here the problem lies: it might be easy to calculate the cost of improving the environmental condition (e.g. building up a giant air purifier, water treatment, etc). But that is just half of the materials to come up with sensible cost-benefit assessment. To justify spending of public money for say, cleaning up the air, there has to be a justification to the proposed costs. That is, we need to calculate the expected benefit of such action. Alas, this is no easy task. Measuring the economic benefits of consuming food or clothes is easy, for they are 'market goods': goods traded tangibly and have price tags on them. The direct proxy of their benefits is simply their market price. But for environmental goods, this is not the case. One needs to apply a particular technique to attach a value to such 'non-market' goods as a proxy of the benefit that later can be contrasted against the cost. That is the objective of economic valuation.
Economic valuation can be based on two different sources of data. First, stated data set. This information is obtained via direct question to respondents. Second, revealed data – information obtained by observing what an economic agent does. There was a time when economists tend to be skeptical on the former, as economics is a 'science of observation'. However, experience has dictated that not every time and for every case historical data are available. This is particularly true for the cases of non-market goods such as environmental quality. Therefore, economists have to rely on stated data: surveys, questionnaires, interviews are employed. Recently, there has been an increasing amount of researches using both resources in combination. One message from these studies is that whatever data resource is employed, what matters is how one can come up with a sensible measure of the value of improving the quality of the environment. The principle here is that, you can not preserve the environment if you have no idea what it is worth. To know the value, you need to calculate how much benefit people will enjoy on top of the cost of the improvement. That again is the use of valuation.
Thank you
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Stimulus for works
The GOI claims that its Rp 73.3 trillion stimulus will create 3m employment, assuming an employment-growth elasticity of between 431 and 450 thousands (The Jakarta Post, 26/2/2009). It seems that GOI expects workers to come to its infrastructre projects that will take Rp 12.2 tr from the stimulus, on top of the Rp 90 tr already allocated in the 2009 state budget. With all this, GOI expects to see a poverty redux from 15.4% last year to 12-13% this year, assuming growth between 4.5 and 5%.
Two notes. First, growth will likely be at 4% and that means employment and poverty targets might be missed. Second, setting targets is one thing, attempting to reach them is quite another. GOI has set so many targets but it is seldom crystal clear how they will achieve them. For one, infrastructure is said to be the champion, but at the same time populist moves such as fuel subsidy increase keeps coming. Also, arguably under DPR's resistance, GOI can't implement more effective modes for stimulus such as direct cash transfer.
Two notes. First, growth will likely be at 4% and that means employment and poverty targets might be missed. Second, setting targets is one thing, attempting to reach them is quite another. GOI has set so many targets but it is seldom crystal clear how they will achieve them. For one, infrastructure is said to be the champion, but at the same time populist moves such as fuel subsidy increase keeps coming. Also, arguably under DPR's resistance, GOI can't implement more effective modes for stimulus such as direct cash transfer.
More redux?
DPR is asking further cut in fuel price from Rp 4,500 to Rp 3,500.
It's DPR. So you judge yourself.
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Paper pick: Jacks et al on Commodity Price Volatility
Commodity Price Volatility and World Market Integration since 1700
by David S. Jacks, Kevin H. O'Rourke, Jeffrey G. Williamson
NBER Working Paper - #14748, 2009
Abstract:
Poor countries are more volatile than rich countries, and we know this volatility impedes their growth. We also know that commodity
price volatility is a key source of those shocks. This paper explores commodity and manufactures price over the past three centuries to answer three questions: Has commodity price volatility increased over time? The answer is no: there is little evidence of trend since 1700. Have commodities always shown greater price volatility than manufactures? The answer is yes. Higher commodity price volatility is not the modern product of asymmetric industrial organizations - oligopolistic manufacturing versus competitive commodity markets - that only appeared with the industrial revolution. It was a fact of life deep into the 18th century. Does world market integration breed more or less commodity price volatility? The answer is less. Three centuries of history shows unambiguously that economic isolation caused by war or autarkic policy has been associated with much greater commodity price volatility, while world market integration associated with peace and pro-global policy has been associated with less commodity price volatility. Given specialization and comparative advantage, globalization has been good for growth in poor countries at least by diminishing price volatility. But comparative advantage has never been constant. Globalization increased poor country specialization in commodities when the world went open after the early 19th century; but it did not do so after the 1970s as the Third World shifted to labor-intensive manufactures. Whether price volatility or specialization dominates terms of trade and thus aggregate volatility in poor countries is thus conditional on the century.
by David S. Jacks, Kevin H. O'Rourke, Jeffrey G. Williamson
NBER Working Paper - #14748, 2009
Abstract:
Poor countries are more volatile than rich countries, and we know this volatility impedes their growth. We also know that commodity
price volatility is a key source of those shocks. This paper explores commodity and manufactures price over the past three centuries to answer three questions: Has commodity price volatility increased over time? The answer is no: there is little evidence of trend since 1700. Have commodities always shown greater price volatility than manufactures? The answer is yes. Higher commodity price volatility is not the modern product of asymmetric industrial organizations - oligopolistic manufacturing versus competitive commodity markets - that only appeared with the industrial revolution. It was a fact of life deep into the 18th century. Does world market integration breed more or less commodity price volatility? The answer is less. Three centuries of history shows unambiguously that economic isolation caused by war or autarkic policy has been associated with much greater commodity price volatility, while world market integration associated with peace and pro-global policy has been associated with less commodity price volatility. Given specialization and comparative advantage, globalization has been good for growth in poor countries at least by diminishing price volatility. But comparative advantage has never been constant. Globalization increased poor country specialization in commodities when the world went open after the early 19th century; but it did not do so after the 1970s as the Third World shifted to labor-intensive manufactures. Whether price volatility or specialization dominates terms of trade and thus aggregate volatility in poor countries is thus conditional on the century.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Forced apology
So there they are. The arrogant guys at Commission VII of the House win. They have successfully forced the bullied Karen Agustina of Pertamina to apologize for something she did right. Effendi Simbolon, Sonny Keraf and their ilk, shame on you.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Feenstra's newest
New paper by Feenstra:
Over the last three decades, the value of Chinese trade has approximately doubled every four years. This rapid growth has transformed the country from a negligible player in world trade to the world's second largest exporter, as well as a substantial importer of raw materials, intermediate inputs, and other goods. This paper provides an overview of the microstructure of Chinese trade, its macroeconomic implications, trade disputes with other WTO member countries, and the role of foreign firms.
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
Bullying Karen
If the story in the Jakarta Post today (17/02/2009) is true, I'm with Karen Agustiawan, the new chief of Pertamina. It is reported that Sony Keraf, deputy chairman of Commission VII stopped the hearing while Agustiawan was still responding to the House's queries.
I'm sick of DPR's demand for respect. They do not deserve one.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Different alpha again?
The Energy and Mineral Resource Ministry is asking another 'alpha' for Pertamina. Now they want a fixed figure of Rp 693.5 if Indonesian Crude Price (ICP) is between $40 and $50; and Rp 704 if between $50 and $60. If we assume ICP match WTI, then those two rupiah figures correspond to an alpha of 15.8 and 13.5, respectively, taking the midpoint of both ranges.
Friday, February 06, 2009
Friday, January 30, 2009
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
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